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FOREIGN BANK PENETRATION AND PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE




We analyse foreign bank penetration in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and its influence on private
sector credit, taking into account both cross-border credit and credit by foreign bank subsidiaries. By
combining BIS and BankScope data into a unique database we make a clear distinction between these
credit categories. We show that the relative importance of foreign bank subsidiaries has increased
considerably during recent years. However, in Hungary and Poland foreign banks were also important
during the first transition years, as they provided substantial amounts of cross-border credit. We do not
find evidence of foreign banks deserting CEE during financial crises or economic downturns. Although
cross-border credit did decrease during some periods, foreign banks expanded the credit supply of their
subsidiaries simultaneously. This may be an important consideration for (transition) countries that still
have to decide whether to open up their markets to foreign bank subsidiaries.
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1. Introduction
The transition from a centrally planned to a market economy has transformed the banking sector in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In this paper we focus on a critical result of this process: the
penetration of foreign banks. During the last decade foreign banks have entered several CEE countries,
but to different degrees. Given the still underdeveloped domestic banking systems in CEE, foreign bank
credit may be a welcome complement to the relatively low levels of domestic credit. Some countries
regarded foreign strategic investors therefore as a means to quickly improve the quality of their banking
system. Yet, foreign bank credit may also turn out to be less stable than domestic credit, especially
during adverse economic times. Although some research has been done for the Latin American case –
where foreign bank penetration is very high as well – the empirical results on CEE are still limited. As
a result, it is not clear yet whether the large-scale presence of foreign banks in CEE should be seen as
an asset, or, on the contrary, as a liability for this region.
In light of this, the goal of our paper is twofold. First, we aim for a comprehensive quantitative
description of foreign banks’ activities during transition. Secondly, we analyse whether the entrance of
foreign banks has negatively influenced total bank credit in the region. More specifically, we want to
find out whether aggregate foreign bank credit declined during periods of economic and/or financial
downturn, and if so, whether such declines were steeper than those of domestic banks. More volatile
credit cycles may then lead to an undesired amplification of the business cycle. To put our results in
perspective, we compare them with similar findings for Latin America. We explicitly pay attention to
both cross-border credit flows and activities of foreign subsidiaries within the region itself. To that end,
we construct a unique and detailed dataset on the quantitative importance of foreign banks in CEE
which combines data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) with data on more than 100
individual banks’ balance sheets. We limit ourselves to five CEE countries which are likely to be among
the first to join the European Union: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. The
paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we briefly review the literature on foreign bank participation
in  (emerging  market)  banking  systems.  Based  on  this  review  we  formulate  our  expectations  or
hypotheses regarding the behaviour of different categories of bank credit in CEE. In section 3 and 4
we  then  describe  our  empirical  approach  and  results.  Finally,  section  5  concludes.  More  details
concerning our dataset can be found in the appendix to this paper.
2. Foreign bank penetration into emerging markets: a review of the literature
There exists a lively debate on the positive and negative effects related to the penetration of foreign
banks into less-developed banking systems. In this paper, "foreign bank penetration" refers to lending6
by foreign banks to domestic firms, either cross-border or by foreign bank subsidiaries situated in
the  (CEE)  host  country.  Furthermore,  “home  country”  denotes  the  country  where  the  bank’s
headquarter is seated, whereas “host country” refers to the country in which the foreign based bank
operates. Generally, the literature on foreign bank penetration focuses on the effects on the efficiency
and / or stability of the host country banking system.
1 In this section we first discuss both the possible
positive  and  negative  consequences  of  foreign  bank  penetration.  After  that,  we  summarise  the
empirical results to date. Lastly, we pose some a priori expectations on the role foreign banks in CEE
have played during transition, using the earlier discussed theoretical and empirical results.
2.1 Positive and negative effects of foreign bank penetration into emerging markets
Foreign bank penetration can have several positive as well as negative implications for emerging and
transition  countries.  On  the  positive  side,  foreign  bank  management  practices  and  information
technology may improve the efficiency of the domestic banking system, both directly and indirectly by
competing with domestic financial institutions  (Levine, 1996). Also, foreign banks may start to offer
new financial services, may stimulate better regulation, accounting standards and the financial and legal
structure more broadly, and may also attract (other) foreign direct investments (FDI). Additionally, a
growing  supply  of  foreign  bank  credit  can  reduce  the  costs  of  obtaining  loans  for  domestic  firms.
Importantly, Cardim De Carvalho (2000) mentions that foreign banks will be more independent of the
local government and may have less incestuous relations with domestic firms. Lastly, well-capitalised
foreign  banks  may  be  able  and  willing  to  keep  lending  to  domestic  firms  during  adverse  economic
conditions, as opposed to domestic banks which will possibly lower their credit supply. On the negative
side, foreign banks might just as well be less inclined to keep up their credit supply in the host country,
for instance when the economic environment in their home country deteriorates. Another source of
concern is that foreign banks may only provide credit to the large and often foreign owned (multi-
national)  firms,  leaving  the  bad  corporate  credit  risks  as  well  as  the  retail  market  and  the  related
payment services to domestic banks ("cherry picking"). Lastly,  Peek and Rosengren (2000) mention
that foreign bank penetration, whether cross-border or by means of local subsidiaries, may weaken the
position of the (less-sophisticated) domestic banking system. Domestic banks that are not able to cope
with the increased competitive pressures may for instance fail and lead to periods of severe financial
instability.
                                                
1 See for instance IMF (2000).7
Some pros and cons are exclusively related to a specific form of entry: through local subsidiaries or
cross-border.  Only  by  buying  a  subsidiary  can  a  foreign  bank  provide  new  funds  to  recapitalise  a
troubled banking sector.
2 Additionally, such subsidiaries can in times of crisis operate as a "safe haven",
and thus reduce the flow of domestic funds abroad as residents can now "do their capital flight at
home".  Finally,  cross-border  credit  by  foreign  banks  may  lead  to  specific  problems  of  financial
instability.  McKinnon  and  Pill  (1997)  show  that  when  a  country  has  an  unlimited  access  to  the
international capital markets, e.g. because of an abundant availability of cross-border credit, and the
local debtors are in addition subject to moral hazard, this will lead to overborrowing and overinvestment.
In sum, it thus appears that the risks and potential disadvantages of foreign bank penetration are not so
much related to the efficiency, but more to the stability of the domestic banking system.
2.2 Empirical results on the effects of foreign bank penetration into emerging markets
The relevance of the arguments for and against the opening up of domestic banking markets to foreign
competition ultimately depends on their empirical validity. To begin with, Claessens et al. (2001) show,
on the basis of a dataset comprising 80 countries, that foreign banks in emerging markets have higher
interest rate margins and profitability than domestic banks (while the opposite is true for developed
markets). Foreign bank penetration also leads to a reduction in the profitability and margins of domestic
banks,  leading  to  the  conclusion  that  foreign  penetration  enhances  the  efficiency  of  the  domestic
banking system. Interestingly, it appears to be the number of foreign banks rather than their size which
is associated with the competitive conditions in the local markets.
3 Apparently, this reflects the fact that
domestic banks immediately react to - and are affected by - the entry of foreign banks, even when
these banks have not yet gained a substantial market share. Lensink and Hermes (2002), extending the
econometric model of Claessens et al. (2001), find that the  effect of foreign bank entry on domestic
banks depends on the level of economic development of a country. Mathieson and Roldos (2001) show
that in Central Europe foreign bank subsidiaries have on average higher returns on equity, lower cost-
to-income ratios and lower problem loans compared to domestic banks.
Complementary to the above results, much empirical research has focused on the effects of
foreign bank penetration on financial stability or the continuity of the credit supply. Dages et al (2000)
show for Argentina and Mexico, and  Crystal  et  al.  (2002)  for  Chile,  Colombia  and  Argentina  that
(established) foreign banks exhibited stronger and less volatile loan growth than domestic banks. Also
                                                
2 Cardim De Carvalho (2000), for instance, points out that the Brazilian banking crisis of 1995 proved to be an
opportunity for foreign banks to acquire local banks. See also Mathieson and Roldos (2001), whose empirical
analysis shows that a banking crisis raises foreign participation and control by about 10 percentage points.
3 Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1998) also find positive efficiency effects associated with the number of foreign banks
(rather than their size).8
during times of crisis, diversity of ownership has contributed to greater stability of credit as foreign
banks showed significant credit growth during crisis periods and thereafter. However,  Dages  et  al
(2000) also find that domestically owned and foreign owned banks with low problem loan ratios behave
similarly, which suggests that bank health, and not ownership per se, has been the critical element in the
growth, volatility, and cyclicality of bank credit. Crystal et al. (2002) find that foreign banks can exert a
positive stabilising influence on the domestic banking system because they combine a stronger credit
growth  with  more  aggressive  provisioning  behaviour,  while  at  the  same  time  preserving  risk-based
capital levels.
4 Kraft (2002) shows that during the Croatian banking crisis of 1998-1999, foreign bank
subsidiaries acted as save havens for depositors. Also, foreign banks expanded their credit supply after
the crisis and alleviated the post-crisis credit crunch in doing so. Focusing on Latin America,  Peek and
Rosengren (2000) find that foreign bank subsidiaries did not reduce their credit supply during adverse
economic times in the host country. Indeed, they viewed such economic problems as opportunities to
expand, by acquisition or by growth of existing subsidiaries. However, off-shore lending, where foreign
banks provide credit from their home country offices, did in some cases retrench during economic
slowdown. Peek and Rosengren (1997) show that the sharp drop in Japanese stock prices starting in
1990, together with binding capital requirements of Japanese banks, led Japanese bank branches in the
USA to reduce their credit supply. However, these effects were much weaker for Japanese bank
subsidiaries,  as  these  are  not  included  in  the  balance  sheet  of  the  parent  bank  and  are  thus  less
directly  exposed  to  the  parent’s capital constraints. Finally,  Demirgüç-Kunt  et  al.  (1998)  find  that
foreign  bank  participation  lowers  the  probability  that  a  country  will  experience  a  banking  crisis.
5
Graham (2001)  notes  that  in  many  countries  domestic  banks  have  proved  to  be  able  to  cope  with
foreign competition. This observation is in line with the results of for instance Claessens et al. (2001)
and Goldberg et al (2000).
The results described above show that opening up domestic banking markets to foreign bank
penetration is likely to improve the efficiency of the domestic banking system. At the same time, the
entrance of foreign banks tends to lower the probability of a banking crisis. Also, results show that
especially local bank subsidiaries will be inclined to keep granting credit during periods of economic
distress. However, cross-border credit - as well as credit granted through local branches instead of
subsidiaries - may be less stable during adverse economic times. In sum, the evidence to date suggests
that foreign bank penetration into host country banking systems can have positive effects for both the
efficiency and the stability of these banking systems.
                                                
4 The relatively high rate of provisioning was especially found at acquired banks, suggesting that these banks
may now apply tighter credit review standards to their portfolios.
5 Again, as with the effect on banking efficiency (cf. footnote 3), the positive effect on banking stability seems to
depend on the number of foreign banks rather than their (relative) size.9
2.3 Foreign banks in Central and Eastern Europe: what do we expect?
To structure our analysis of foreign bank activity in CEE, we use our dataset to test a number of a
priori expectations, which are partly based on the above described literature. First of all, we expect that
during  our  sample  period  (1993-2000),  total  foreign  bank  credit  in  CEE  has  increased  relative  to
domestic bank credit as well as relative to GDP. In addition, we expect that credit by foreign bank
subsidiaries has increased relative to cross-border foreign bank credit. Such a development would be in
line with that in Latin America, where foreign subsidiaries’ credit expanded faster than cross-border
credit flows by foreign based mother companies (Peek and Rosengren, 2000). Whereas foreign bank
credit may have gained importance over the sample period as a whole, (some forms of) foreign bank
credit  may  still  have  declined  temporarily.  Local  brick-and-mortar  subsidiaries  may  for  instance  be
more inclined to keep granting credit during difficult economic times - such as a recession or a financial
crisis  -  than  foreign  based  parent  banks  or  even  domestic  banks.  If  foreign  bank  subsidiaries  are
relatively important, they might then have a stabilising influence on the total amount of credit during
such periods. Indeed, we expect that during episodes of adverse economic conditions, foreign bank
subsidiaries’ credit did not decline or declined less than domestic bank credit. In contrast, we expect
that cross-border credit was temporarily withdrawn in some cases.
3.  Measuring foreign bank penetration in Central and Eastern Europe
Two distinct aspects of foreign banking activity can be distinguished: cross-border activities and the
activities of local bank subsidiaries in the host country itself (Wachtel, 1998). To gain more insight into
the  relative  importance  of  cross-border  credit,  credit  by  foreign  bank  subsidiaries  and  credit  by
domestic banks, we combine BIS data with BankScope data. After a first analysis of this combined
database,  we  construct  four  measures  of  foreign  bank  penetration,  using  the  methodology  as  first
applied to Latin America by Peek and Rosengren (2000). These measures enable us to analyse the
lending and deposit taking by brick-and-mortar foreign bank subsidiaries as well as true cross-border
lending.  We  are  especially  interested  in  any  differences  between  changes  in  cross-border  credit,
foreign subsidiaries’ credit and domestic banks’ credit during crisis periods.
6
As stated, we combine two data sources. First, we employ consolidated BIS data on total on-
balance sheet claims by BIS reporting banks on the five CEE countries we study. These data refer to
                                                
6 Talley et al (1998) show that since 1993 debt flows (loans and bonds) have accounted for about 50% of net
private inflows (which also includes FDI and equity investments) into CEE. Moreover, commercial banks own a
substantial part of this debt, which is to a large extent absorbed by the domestic banking system. However, the
BIS-data the authors use for deriving the consolidated “cross border” claims include the local claims of foreign
affiliates of the reporting banks. Such local claims may behave rather differently compared to true cross-border -
or off shore claims, as is indeed shown for Latin America by Peek and Rosengren (2000) and for CEE by our own
results.10
the consolidated exposures vis à vis a particular CEE country of the banks headquartered in all BIS
reporting  countries.  In  addition  to  the  BIS  data,  we  use  individual  bank  data  from  Fitch  IBCA's
BankScope database  (annual  frequency).
7 For  us,  the  value  of  this  data  source  is  that  it  provides
complementary data on both the domestic banks in CEE (which are not BIS reporting) and on foreign
bank subsidiaries from  non-BIS  reporting  countries.  Of  course,  it  also  provides  data  on  the  BIS-
reporting foreign bank subsidiaries (their claims are included in the consolidated BIS-data as well). We
obtained balance sheet and income data on individual banks and bank subsidiaries that were included in
BankScope for the period 1993-2000.
8 Before 1993, independent CEE banks had only just emerged and
the quality of balance sheet data is therefore questionable. After 2000, BankScope data were - at the
time of the writing of this paper - only available for a limited number of banks. We examined the
ownership structure of all banks in our sample for each separate year, and then constructed a “foreign”
or “domestic” dummy for each bank in each year.
9 Given the numerous changes in ownership over the
years,  the  latter  is  a  quite  important  aspect  to  capture.  Our  combined  dataset  has  three  main
advantages:  (1)  it  captures  both  cross-border  and  within  host  country  foreign  bank  activity,  (2)  it
includes foreign subsidiaries from non BIS reporting banks, and (3) it gives a factual picture of the
importance of foreign bank subsidiaries’ activities. More details on the construction of our dataset can
be found in the appendix to this paper.
4.  Descriptive statistics
In sub-section 4.1 we give a detailed analysis of the development of foreign banking in each of the
countries we study. We first use two relatively simple indicators of foreign bank penetration based on
the BankScope database: the number of foreign banks relative to domestic banks and the amount of
assets owned by foreign banks relative to total bank assets. Furthermore, we discuss the total BIS-
claims to each country.
10 These figures reflect the development of the total stock of credit - both cross-
border and claims by local subsidiaries - granted by banks headquartered in all BIS reporting countries
(see footnote 32). We also discuss the sectoral division of BIS-credit (see table 1). Additionally, we
                                                
7 This database has three main advantages: (1) comprehensive coverage, as about 90% of the assets in each
country are covered by the banks included; (2) Fitch makes an effort to adjust individual bank accounts for
differences in reporting and accounting standards, and additionally puts the accounts into a standardised global
format; (3) individual bank data can be used which are usually not available from official sources. The main
drawback is that the activities of some foreign branches are not captured, which can lead to an underestimation of
the level of foreign participation (Mathieson and Roldos, 2001).
8 Our focus in this paper is on banks and their financing of the private non-bank sector. We therefore included
only commercial banks, savings banks, co-operative banks, real estate / mortgage banks and medium and long
term  credit  banks  in  our  sample.  We  excluded  such  categories  as  securities  houses,  non  banking  credit
institutions, specialised governmental credit institutions, central banks and multilateral governmental banks.
9 We considered a bank to be foreign if foreign shareholders hold 50% or more of total equity.11
analyse true cross-border credit from BIS-countries, credit by foreign bank subsidiaries (both BIS and
non BIS-reporting) and credit by domestic banks. These numbers – both absolute and in percentages of
GDP - can be found in tables 2-7.
11 After that, sub-section 4.2 describes our computations of a more
sophisticated measure of foreign bank penetration, which also includes cross-border credit. Sub-section
4.3 then goes explicitly into the behaviour of foreign banks during economic downturns. Finally sub-
section 4.4 compares our results with those on foreign bank activities in Latin America.
Table 1  BIS credit by sector (banks, public sector, non-bank private sector, and
unallocated), in percentages
Estonia Hungary
Year Banks Public Private Unallocated Banks Public Private Unallocated
1992 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 53.7 32.6 12.4 1.2
1993 41.3 0.0 58.7 0.0 54.7 29.3 15.2 0.7
1994 18.2 0.0 81.8 0.0 57.1 30.0 12.8 0.0
1995 29.0 0.0 71.0 0.0 57.1 28.4 14.6 0.0
1996 46.1 5.8 47.8 0.4 56.2 23.4 20.4 0.0
1997 54.3 2.0 43.6 0.1 52.4 15.1 32.5 0.0
1998 56.6 1.2 42.2 0.0 54.7 11.8 33.1 0.4
1999 53.8 2.9 40.9 2.4 49.3 19.7 30.3 0.6
2000 29.5 1.9 63.8 4.8 42.5 23.3 34.2 0.0
Poland Slovenia
Year Banks Public Private Unallocated Banks Public Private Unallocated
1992 65.6 18.3 12.6 3.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1993 66.5 18.0 13.5 1.9 45.3 18.6 36.2 0.0
1994 54.4 24.3 21.0 0.3 37.3 16.9 45.8 0.0
1995 26.5 41.2 31.5 0.8 42.1 18.3 34.5 5.1
1996 29.3 38.3 32.3 0.0 38.0 26.0 36.0 0.0
1997 34.0 24.6 41.3 0.1 35.2 27.4 37.3 0.0
1998 36.0 20.0 43.7 0.3 35.0 25.7 39.3 0.0
1999 38.0 13.8 46.5 1.7 34.7 28.9 36.0 0.4
2000 30.9 19.5 49.1 0.5 32.9 30.5 36.2 0.5
Czech Republic
Year Banks Public Private Unallocated
1992 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1993 39.9 23.4 36.7 0.0
1994 47.6 16.6 35.8 0.0
1995 59.2 10.4 30.4 0.0
1996 61.2 7.3 31.5 0.0
1997 61.1 5.0 33.9 0.0
1998 56.6 5.2 38.0 0.2
1999 50.8 6.4 42.0 0.7
2000 44.2 6.7 47.8 1.3
Source: BIS consolidated international banking statistics.
                                                                                                                                                        
10 Since banks report their consolidated exposures to the BIS in US dollars, we checked whether or not the
developments in our BIS data were mainly driven by exchange rate movements instead of developments in the
underlying credit stocks (which are originally denominated in both US dollars and other currencies). It appeared
that exchange rate conversion did not significantly drive the changes in total BIS claims expressed in US dollars.
11 Number of banks, amount of foreign assets, total BIS credit and cross-border credit are shown by country and
clockwise in pane 1 through 4, respectively, of figure 1.12
Table 2 Crossborder credit from BIS reporting countries (in mln $)
Country
Year Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia Czech Republic
1993 23 7564 11359 66 291
1994 28 5284 9347 312 844
1995 55 5525 6279 702 2311
1996 131 4250 6904 1208 3783
1997 424 6185 7180 1683 6176
1998 1040 5669 7466 96 5670
1999 1537 6041 12042 1003 5737
2000 231 7671 6660 1581 4685
Source: BIS consolidated international banking statistics and BankScope
Table 3 Credit by domestic banks (in mln $)
Country
Year Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia Czech Republic
1993 13 5156 16551 1584 23917
1994 30 7219 22608 5478 33547
1995 344 13881 30702 7432 42984
1996 1037 12316 40525 8832 47646
1997 2066 12139 44992 8905 40094
1998 2828 9392 49087 11447 45985
1999 2599 8413 49567 10769 28179
2000 279 6902 31013 10757 22759
Source: BankScope
Table 4 Credit by foreign bank subsidiaries (within country) (in mln $)
Country
Year Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia Czech Republic
1993 0 1376 486 122 1115
1994 0 3650 837 160 2686
1995 0 4644 1423 272 5415
1996 0 6829 2399 434 7249
1997 0 7326 7156 427 7513
1998 0 14574 12772 2276 9799
1999 0 15600 15887 1971 10617
2000 2584 16472 30070 1729 16362
Source: BankScope13
Figure 1 Developments of key variables by country, 1993-2000
Estonia
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4.1 Foreign bank penetration in CEE: a country analysis
Estonia
Figure 1 clearly shows the consolidation process the Estonian domestic banking market went through at
the end of the 1990’s, as well as the entrance of a few (large) foreign banks in the course of 1999.
12
However, the limited number of banks in 1993 and 1994 – two and three respectively – reflects the
fact that many small credit institutions that went bankrupt during these years, are not included in our
BankScope  dataset.
13  Although  the  number  of  foreign  banks  (marked  “?”  in  figure  1)  equals  the
number of domestic banks in 2000 (marked “O”), these two - Swedish-owned - banks (Hansabank and
Eesti Ühispank) are by far the largest banks in Estonia. They make up the bulk of the small Estonian
banking market, holding 91% (marked “?”) of all banking assets in 2000. Figure 1 also shows that
foreign credit was nearly absent before 1994 as the banking sector was recovering from the 1992
banking crisis. Foreign bank activities started to increase significantly only after 1996. Before 2000, the
third  and  the  fourth  pane  essentially  show  the  same  picture,  as  foreign  bank  subsidiaries  were
completely absent. Remarkably, pane 3 shows that foreign bank subsidiaries do not grant any credits
denominated in the Estonian Kroon. Because of the Estonian currency board, banks in effect purchase
only euros from the Bank of Estonia and pass on the exchange risk to their borrowers by lending in
euros as well. Foreign credit dropped only temporarily - by almost 6% - during the first half of 1999,
when the Estonian banking system experienced another crisis in a reaction to the Asian and Russian
crises. As table 1 shows, about two thirds of foreign bank credit in Estonia is nowadays allocated to the
non-bank private sector.
14 In 1999, domestic banks - then still including Hansabank and Eesti Ühispank
- still absorbed almost 54% of foreign bank credit. Foreign credit to the public sector has been limited
throughout the whole of the transition period. Finally, tables 5-7 give more insight into the importance of
different kinds of credit for the Estonian private sector.
15  During  the  transition  period,  cross-border
credit into the country gradually increased, but sharply declined in 2000 as foreign banks bought local
subsidiaries. In 1999, cross-border credit and domestic bank credit amounted to 30% and 51% of GDP
respectively, while no local foreign subsidiaries were present in the country. In 2000, this situation had
changed dramatically. Foreign subsidiaries’ credit supply is as high as 53% of GDP, largely resulting
                                                
12 Which show up as “foreign” in our BankScope data in 2000.
13 Cf. footnote 8.
14 A sector-by-sector division of the pure cross-border figures as shown in pane 4 is not possible.
15 Note, however, that cross-border credit in table 5 includes credit to domestic banks. Insofar this is the case,
table 5 will overestimate the importance of cross-border credit as a source of finance for CEE enterprises, since the
ultimate financing of CEE firms is not done by the foreign bank itself but by a domestic bank. Such financing is
then already accounted for in table 6. Still, one should not forget that in case this cross-border credit to local
banks would cease, the CEE enterprises would probably face a lower (domestic) credit supply as their banks face
a squeeze in their financing.15
from substitution of domestic assets into foreign assets (the former now account for only 6% of GDP).
Cross-border credit has shrunk as well: to 5% of GDP.
Table 5 Crossborder credit from BIS reporting countries (% of GDP)
Country
Year Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia Czech Republic
1993 1.4 19.6 13.2 0.5 0.8
1994 1.2 12.8 10.1 2.2 2.1
1995 1.5 12.4 5.3 3.7 4.4
1996 2.9 9.4 5.1 6.4 6.5
1997 8.9 13.5 5.3 9.2 11.7
1998 20.5 12.1 4.7 0.5 10.2
1999 30.4 12.7 7.8 5.0 10.8
2000 4.7 16.9 4.2 8.7 9.5
Source: BIS consolidated international banking statistics, BankScope, EBRD
Note that the GDP-figures that were used to construct the last row (2000)
are estimates only.
Table 6 Credit by domestic banks (% of GDP)
Country
Year Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia Czech Republic
1993 0.8 13.3 19.2 12.4 68.6
1994 1.3 17.5 24.4 37.9 81.9
1995 9.5 31.2 25.8 39.5 82.7
1996 23.2 27.3 30.1 46.8 82.3
1997 43.4 26.5 33.1 48.9 76.2
1998 55.8 20.0 31.2 58.4 82.5
1999 51.4 17.6 32.1 53.6 53.1
2000 5.7 15.2 19.5 59.3 46.1
Source: BankScope, EBRD
Note that the GDP-figures that were used to construct the last row (2000)
are estimates only.
Table 7 Credit by foreign bank subsidiaries (within country) (% of GDP)
Country
Year Estonia Hungary Poland Slovenia Czech Republic
1993 0.0 3.6 0.6 1.0 3.2
1994 0.0 8.8 0.9 1.1 6.6
1995 0.0 10.4 1.2 1.4 10.4
1996 0.0 15.1 1.8 2.3 12.5
1997 0.0 16.0 5.3 2.3 14.3
1998 0.0 31.1 8.1 11.6 17.6
1999 0.0 32.7 10.3 9.8 20.0
2000 52.6 36.2 18.9 9.5 33.1
Source: BankScope, EBRD
Note that the GDP-figures per capita that were used to construct the last
row (2000) are estimates only.16
Hungary
The Hungarian banking market was opened for foreign banks as early as the beginning of the 1980's,
when foreign banks were allowed to set up subsidiaries in Budapest. The first pane in figure 1 clearly
reflects the divergence in the development of domestic and foreign banks during the second half of the
1990’s.  The  number  of  banks  which  were  majority  owned  by  foreign  strategic  investors  gradually
started to rise as a result of the privatisation strategy of the Hungarian government. The selling of these
majority stakes to foreign banks is being mirrored in a decline in the number of banks that remain
majority  owned  by  Hungarian  shareholders.  Whereas  the  foreign  banks  already  outnumbered  the
domestic banks in 1993, the amount of foreign assets only outgrew total domestic assets in 1998. In
2000, 71% of all banking assets were in foreign hands. Total BIS-claims to Hungary were already
relatively high at the beginning of the transition period, mostly reflecting large amounts of cross-border
credit. Cross-border credit declined during the first half of the 1990’s but increased again during the
second half. In 2000, cross-border credit amounted to as much as 17% of GDP. This is extremely high
when compared to credit by domestic banks, which was only 15% of GDP in 2000.
16 Local currency
claims by foreign bank subsidiaries started to take off from the second half of 1997, reflecting the
successful  completion  of  the  bank  rehabilitation  process  at  the  end  of  1995.  From  1996  onwards,
foreign  banks  started  to  invest  as  the  Hungarian  economy  recovered  and  the  political  framework
proved stable (Storf, 2000). The growth in foreign credit was interrupted briefly during the first half of
1999,  in  the  wake  of  the  Russian  crisis,  when  cross-border  credit  and  foreign  subsidiary  credit  in
foreign  currencies  declined  by  14%.  At  the  same  time,  local  currency  claims  by  foreign  bank
subsidiaries actually increased by 17%. During the last decade Hungarian banks and the public sector
gradually receive smaller shares of the total amount of foreign credit, whereas the non-bank private
sector has profited most from the increase in foreign bank credit. In 2000 it received 34% of all foreign
credit, still below the share which is absorbed by the domestic banks (43%).
Poland
The first two Polish panes in figure 1 show the consolidation process in the domestic banking sector
and the related increase in the number of banks that are majority foreign owned. The pace of domestic
consolidation has nevertheless been quicker than the increase in the number of foreign banks, resulting
in a decrease in the overall number of banks during 2000. In that year foreign bank subsidiaries also
outnumbered  domestic  banks  for  the  first  time.  However,  the  amount  of  foreign  assets  only  just
equalled the amount of domestic assets. The second pane nevertheless shows a clear upward trend in
the  importance  of  foreign  bank  assets  compared  to  domestic  assets.  This  is  also  reflected  in  the
                                                
16 Reininger et al (2001, p. 36) also point to the importance of cross-border credit into Hungary in recent years.17
development of the amount of credit by foreign subsidiaries which is granted in Zloty (pane 3). This
started to rise steeply as from the second half of 1996 and even became the most important “foreign”
credit source by the end of 2000. Almost 50% of all foreign bank credit is nowadays directed to Polish
enterprises. A further 20% and 30% is allocated to the public sector and domestic banks respectively.
In 1992, domestic banks’ share in absorbing foreign credit was more than twice the current share.
During the 1993-1995 period cross-border credit shrank substantially, and this decline was only partly
offset by an increase in credit granted by foreign bank subsidiaries. Noteworthy is that there was no
significant  decline  in  BIS  claims  to  Poland  during  or  after  the  Russian  financial  crisis.  During  the
transition process cross-border credit has gradually become less important for Poland and amounted to
only 4% of GDP in 2000. In contrast, foreign bank subsidiaries have grown spectacularly since 1997
and their credit supply amounted in 2000 to about 19% of GDP. In the same year domestic bank credit
was just a bit more important, as it amounted to 20% of GDP.
Slovenia
The first two Slovenian panes in figure 1 show that the domestic banking sector has gone through a
consolidation process in recent years, starting with the establishment of four banking groups in 1997.
The number of foreign banks has been stable - four since 1998 - as the privatisation of the state-owned
banks had not yet started. This is also reflected in a small and stable foreign bank presence, which has
moved to a somewhat higher level since 1998. In 2000, less than 15% of all banking assets were in the
hands of foreign banks.
17 Foreign credit to Slovenia is modest, but has been rising steadily during the
1990s and did not decline around the time of the Russian crisis.
18 Foreign  credit  is  allocated  rather
evenly to banks, non-bank private enterprises and the public sector. Noteworthy is that during the last
ten years, banks’ share has declined in favour of that of the public sector. In the absence of any
serious foreign competition, the importance of the Slovenian domestic banking system for the domestic
economy has gradually increased from 12% of GDP in 1993 to 59% in 2000. Interestingly, the closed
character of the Slovenian economy has not led to a low level of financial depth as domestic credit has
increased steadily during the last 10 years. When we add cross-border credit, foreign subsidiary credit
and domestic bank credit and divide this by GDP we get a measure of total financial depth. In 2000
total financial depth was respectively 63% (Estonia), 68% (Hungary), 43% (Poland), 78% (Slovenia)
and 89% (Czech Republic). It is striking that Slovenia has managed to reach a reasonable level of
financial  depth,  without  allowing  substantial  foreign  bank  activities.  However,  financial  depth  as
                                                
17 According to Kouyoumdjian (2001) foreign penetration was even as low as 12%.
18 However, a sharp but temporary decline took place in pure cross-border credit in 1998 as shown in the fourth
Slovenian pane. Most likely, this is a temporary statistical bias due to the fact that we computed the amount of18
measured by credit / GDP is only a rather rough measure of the importance of the financial system for
the economy, as it only measures the quantity of credit and not the quality of the credit allocation.
Czech Republic
Due to poor economic conditions, the clean up of the banking system and the restrictive monetary
policy, credit to the private sector has been declining since 1997  (Wagner and Iakova, 2001 and The
Economist, 2001). As from 1998 many of the large banks were privatised by selling them to foreign
strategic investors. The first Czech pane in figure 1 illustrates the consolidation process in the Czech
domestic banking sector, resulting in a declining number of domestic banks. This process is only partly
the result of the privatisation of state-owned banks to foreign strategic investors. It is also related to the
economic  downturn  starting  in  1997  and  the  stricter  loan  classification  and  provisioning  rules  the
authorities introduced after the currency crisis of May 1997. Pane 2 shows that during the recession
years 1998 and 1999, and also during 2000 total domestic assets decreased sharply.
19 Yet, during those
same  years,  foreign  bank  subsidiary  assets  increased  and  whereas  in  1999  this  increase  was  not
enough to offset the declining amount of domestic  assets,  in  2000  it  was  large  enough  to  curb  the
declining trend in total banking assets. In this year foreign bank assets rose to about 41% of all banking
assets.
20  In  addition,  the  striped  line  in  the  third  pane  shows  that  the  increase  in  foreign  bank
subsidiaries’ credit during the recession years 1998-1999 (+172% ) is denominated in Czech Koruna. In
contrast, the solid line in this pane shows that during the same period, cross-border credit together with
foreign  affiliates’  credit  in  foreign  currencies  d eclined  (-10%).  Pure  cross-border  credit  (pane  4)
declined with 7% during this period and with another 18% in 2000. Thus, while during the recession
period domestic credit contracted sharply and cross-border credit declined to a somewhat lesser extent,
foreign subsidiaries’ credit, chiefly denominated in Czech Koruna, did increase. However, in absolute
terms the increase in foreign subsidiaries credit (+ USD 8.8 billion) was not enough no completely
offset the decline in domestic credit (-USD 17.3 billion) and cross-border credit (- USD 1.5 billion)
during the 1998-2000 period. On the one hand, the increase in foreign bank assets and the simultaneous
decrease in domestic bank credit reflects positive, respectively negative, autonomous growth of both
                                                                                                                                                        
cross-border credit by immediately subtracting all credit of the new Slovenian foreign bank subsidiary from the
BIS-figures, whereas these last figures did probably not yet contain all of the new credits in that year.
19 Reininger et al (2001, p. 11) state that if there had been no transfers of bad loans to Konsolidacní Banka
between 1998 and 2000, the stock of domestic credit as a percentage of GDP would have been 13.4% higher in
2000. However, even when taking this correction into account, there remains a considerable (autonomous) decline
in domestic credit between 1998 and 2000.
20 Note that the sale of Ceská Sporitelna and Investicni a Postovni Banka in 2000 and the sale of Komercní Banka
to the French Société Générale in June 2001 do not yet show up in our 2000 figures. When taking into account the
sale of these three large banks to foreign strategic investors, foreign ownership rises to almost 95% of al bank
assets.19
bank categories. On the other hand, it also reflects the effect of the taking over of domestic banks by
foreign banks. However, in both cases the increase in foreign bank subsidiaries’ credit reflects the fact
that foreign banks were not scared off by problems in the host country but instead expanded their local
activities. At the same time, cross-border credit actually showed a significant decline. About 44% of all
foreign credit into the Czech Republic is absorbed by the local banking system, 48% by the non-bank
private sector and only 7% by the public sector.
4.2 Including cross-border credit in the measurement of foreign bank penetration
The above discussion shows that cross-border credit has been an important source of foreign bank
credit in CEE. For example, in 2000 cross-border credit into Hungary still amounts to 17% of GDP.
Traditional measures of foreign bank penetration, such as the number of banks and the relative size of
foreign subsidiaries’ assets may then underestimate the true amount of foreign bank penetration. A
brief look at tables 5-7 shows that this is indeed the case for the countries we study. In 2000 cross-
border credit amounted to 9%, 47%, 22%, 91% and 29% of credit by foreign bank subsidiaries in
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic respectively. Reininger et al (2001, p. 66)
note that cross-border loans have led to declining interest rate margins and thus lower profitability in the
domestic CEE banking sectors. Consequently, due to its quantitative and qualitative importance, we
think that cross-border credit should be explicitly taken into account in the measurement of foreign
bank penetration. We do this by constructing the following measures of foreign bank penetration for
each year and for each country (following Peek and Rosengren, 2000):
1. Broad loan measure
For  this  measure  we  first  calculate  total  foreign  credit  as  total  BIS  claims  plus  credit  by  non  BIS
reporting foreign subsidiaries.
21 As stated before, the only claims that are now missing are cross-border
loans by banks from non BIS reporting countries booked by the parent bank rather than through a CEE
subsidiary. This sum is divided by the sum of the total BIS claims, credit by non BIS reporting foreign
subsidiaries and the claims of all domestic banks. An important advantage of this measure is that it
takes into account the fact that foreign banks can very well participate in CEE without owning local
subsidiaries,  but  simply  by  extending  cross-border  credit.  Note  that  this  broad  loan  measure  also
includes credit through BIS reporting foreign branches (as opposed to subsidiaries). This is a second
                                                
21 We also calculated this broad loan measure by using total BIS claims minus claims on the local banking sector
in both the numerator and the denominator. After all, one could argue that a penetration measure should only
measure the credits to the ultimate debtors and not to host country financial intermediaries such as banks. Since
the resulting broad loan measures showed a very similar development over time, only on a somewhat lower level,
they are not reported in this paper.20
advantage compared to penetration measures which are based on BankScope data only (such as the
following  narrow  loan  measure),  as  BankScope  does  not  contain  information  on  most  foreign  bank
branches.
2. Narrow loan measure
The second measure of bank penetration focuses on lending through foreign subsidiaries within CEE
only and thus ignores cross-border credit. It is calculated as credit by foreign subsidiaries (from both
BIS  reporting  and  non  BIS  reporting  countries)  divided  by  total  credit  by  foreign  subsidiaries  and
domestic banks. This measure thus equals the asset measure as reflected in pane 2 for each country in
figure 1.
3 + 4. Broad and narrow funding measure
These two measures focus on bank liabilities rather than bank assets. First, we use a limited measure
of  deposits,  which  includes  demand  deposits,  savings  deposits,  and  time  deposits  (narrow  funding
measure). Secondly, we construct a more expansive funding measure that - besides other categories of
deposits such as interbank deposits - includes total borrowed funds like open market funding and other
short-term borrowing (broad funding measure). For both measures, we compare funding by all foreign
subsidiaries to the total funding by foreign subsidiaries as well as domestically owned banks. As Peek
and Rosengren (2000) remark, the deposit penetration measure (measure 3) focuses particularly on
foreign participation in the retail market whereas the loan measures may also capture the operations of
foreign banks in the wholesale markets.
Figure 2 shows the development of foreign bank penetration for each country as measured by our four
measures. For Estonia, the narrow loan and both deposit measures show that before 2000 no foreign
subsidiaries were active in this country. With the entrance of the Swedish strategic investors Swedbank
and SEB in 1999 more than 90% of credit that was granted by local banks became foreign owned.
However, the broad loan measure, which also encompasses cross-border credit granted by foreign
banks located outside of Estonia decreased from 64% in 1993 to 11% in 1996, reflecting the declining
importance of cross-border credit relative to domestic credit. There was thus no absolute decrease in
foreign bank activity. Between 1996 and 1999 the measure increases again to 37%, as cross-border
credit gradually gains in importance again. Then in 2000, the broad loan measure jumps to 91%, as
domestic credit is “bought” by foreign strategic investors when domestic banks are turned into foreign
subsidiaries.21
For Hungary, the narrow loan and the deposit measures follow the same pattern, suggesting that the
relative importance of foreign subsidiaries compared to domestic banks did not differ much between
the asset and the liability side of the banking system. These three measures show that foreign bank
penetration gradually increased. In 1993, foreign subsidiaries’ market share was only about 22%. In
2000 this number had increased to 71% at the asset side and around 63% at the deposit side.











































































































The 4 panes by country show, clockwise, the
following penetration measures: “broad loan”,
“narrow loan”, “broad deposits” and “narrow
deposits”.
Source: Bankscope, BIS, and authors’ calculations.22
When  we  broaden  our  view  and  take  into  account  cross-border  credit  as  well,  this  figure  is  even
higher. It then appears that in 2000 even 78% of all credit granted to Hungarian firms originated from a
foreign bank, located either within or outside the Hungarian borders. Interestingly, the data show that
during the beginning of the transition period, foreign credit played an important role in the Hungarian
economy as well. As early as 1993, more than 60% of all credit was foreign in nature. This percentage
declined during the following period, but was never lower than 42%. This decline in the broad loan
measure was the result of a sharp increase in domestic credit combined with only a limited rise in total
foreign bank credit. Cross-border credit even declined between 1993 and 1996, but was more than
offset by an increase in foreign bank subsidiaries’ credit. This points to a substitution process in which
banks started to grant credit from within Hungary’s borders instead of cross-border, which is also
shown by the fact that the broad loan measure has been increasing much slower than the increase in
the narrow loan measure.
For  Poland,  the  last  three  penetration  measures  show  an  increasing  importance  of  foreign
subsidiaries in this country. By 2000 their market share was about 50% on the credit side and 45% on
the deposits side, the result of a rather dramatic increase since the beginning of the nineties when
foreign subsidiaries’ market share did not exceed 5%. However, as in Hungary, foreign banks were not
unimportant  at  the  beginning  of  the  transition  process.  Indeed,  our  broad  loan  penetration  measure
shows that when we include cross-border credit in our analysis, 42% of all credit was of foreign origin
in 1993 (2000: 54%). Foreign banks’ influence on the Polish economy thus appears to have been larger
than would be estimated on the basis of more conventional measures that focus only on bank credit
granted within Poland itself. Between 1993 and 1996 the broad loan penetration measure declines to
19% as the decline in cross-border credit is only partly being counterbalanced by an increase in credit
by foreign subsidiaries. After 1996, this measure goes upward as cross-border credit starts to increase
and locally granted credit by foreign subsidiaries increases further as well.
For Slovenia the picture is rather different. All four measures remain relatively low during the
whole sample period. The three penetration measures that focus on local foreign bank subsidiaries only
show a very low level of foreign penetration of about 7% in 1993 and 14% in 2000 (in full due to the
entrance of foreign bank subsidiaries in 1998). The broad loan measure increases more gradually, from
12% in 1993 to 24% in 2000. Foreign bank activity in the relatively closed Slovenian economy is still
very  limited.  The  fact  that  until  now  most  of  the  banking  sector  has  remained  in  state  hands,  is
reflected in the low level of the second, third and fourth penetration measure, which even decreases
between 1998 and 2000. Given the favourable Slovenian economic development during these years, this
decrease  probably  reflects  the  fact  that  recently  acquired  subsidiaries  have  initially  focused  on23
cleansing  their  balance  sheets.
22  As  a  result,  the  amount  of  credit  granted  by  foreign  subsidiaries
declined between 1998 and 2000. At the same time, however, cross-border credit increased enough to
raise the total amount of foreign credit, thus leading to a continuing rise in the broad loan penetration
measure.
Finally, the Czech graphs show a rapid increase in all four penetration measures. The narrow
loan measure increases from 4% in 1993 to 41% in 2000. The penetration of foreign bank subsidiaries
into the deposit market has been somewhat lower: from about 3% in 1993 to 34% in 2000. When we
compare this with the broad loan measure, we find an increase from 6% in 1993 to 48% in 2000. In
contrast with Poland and Hungary, the role of cross-border credit into the Czech Republic thus seems
to have been less important, especially during the first years of the transition period. Also note that
even though cross-border credit declined between 1997 and 2000, this does not show up in the broad
loan penetration measure, as this decline was more than offset by an increase in foreign subsidiaries’
credit. Also, domestic bank credit decreased substantially during this period.
4.3 Stability of foreign bank credit during unfavourable economic times
Foreign  bank  penetration  in  CEE  has  increased  significantly  throughout  the  transition  process.
Nevertheless, during some adverse economic times a temporary reduction in foreign bank credit did
take place. An important external shock to the countries we look at is the Russian crisis in 1998. The
strongest negative effect of this crisis was felt in Estonia, where economic growth went negative in
1999 and a banking crisis at that time reduced the number of banks. Additionally, stock prices declined
heavily between end-1997 and mid-1999. Although initially there was a temporary drop in total credit
from BIS-reporting banks during the first half of 1999, the crisis ultimately proved to be an opportunity
for  foreign  banks  to  expand.  The  lower  stock  prices  made  Estonian  banks  an  attractive  take-over
target and the two largest banks were bought by Swedish strategic investors. Hungary was affected by
the Russian crisis as well, though to a lesser extent (cf. figure 3).
23 Banks increased their provisioning,
one bank failed, and during 1998 and the first half of 1999 cross-border credit declined somewhat. Yet,
local currency claims by foreign bank subsidiaries increased at the same time.
24
The stability of credit is not only affected by financial crises, but also by cyclical movements in
economic activity. The Czech Republic experienced a recession in 1997-1999, following the currency
crisis of May 1997. During the following years, credit by domestic banks contracted and in 1998 and
                                                
22 Cf. Crystal et al. (2002) who find similar behaviour for newly acquired bank subsidiaries in Latin America.
23 Figure 3 represents the situation for Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. The upper three graphs show the
yearly percentage changes of domestic credit and credit by foreign subsidiaries (left axis) compared to GDP-
growth (right axis). The lower three graphs show the same picture, but substitute foreign cross-border credit for
foreign subsidiaries’ credit.
24 The Slovenian and Polish banking systems were much less affected by the Russian crisis.24
2000 cross-border foreign credit declined as well. However, the bad financial health of the domestic
banks  proved  to  be  an  expansion  opportunity  for  foreign  bank  subsidiaries,  which  increased  their
market share at both the deposit and the credit side. Lastly, GDP-growth in Poland shows a declining
trend since 1995. At the same time, growth rates of domestic credit have declined as well, even turning
negative in 2000. Cross-border credit did not show much growth either, as opposed to credit by foreign
subsidiaries, which has been increasing rapidly. In sum, our results show no evidence of “cut and run”
behaviour by foreign banks. In some cases cross-border credit declined temporarily, but this decline
was more than offset by a (lasting) increase in local subsidiaries’ credit, which noticed an opportunity
to expand. In the Czech case, the increase in total foreign bank credit even partially counterbalanced a
decrease in domestic credit during the recession.
4.4 Foreign bank penetration and bank credit stability: how do CEE and Latin America
compare?
In the above sub-section we explicitly look into on the behaviour of foreign banks in CEE around the
time of the Russian financial crisis. Peek and Rosengren (2000) also focus on foreign bank behaviour
during a crisis period, namely the case of Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina around the time of the East





















































































































Figure 3 Growth of different bank credit sources compared with GDP-growth
Source:  BankScope,  BIS,  EBRD  Transition  Report25
of all penetration measures in these countries when comparing the situation before and after the East
Asian crisis. They conclude that foreign banks even expand during troubled times in the host country.
25
The authors also note that cross-border lending does sometimes decline in case of problems in the host
country. When we further compare their results with ours, we find some other striking similarities. First
of all, at the beginning of their sample period they find broad loan penetration measures that are more
than twice as large as the other three, domestically orientated penetration measures. At the same time,
these broad loan penetration measures have been increasing much slower than the other measures,
implying an increasing importance of lending by local brick and mortar subsidiaries relative to cross
border lending.
26 This is exactly the result we find for Hungary, Poland and in extremo for Estonia.
In addition, we find for these three countries that the broad loan penetration measures actually
follow  a  U-curve,  largely  reflecting  the  rapid  increase  in  domestic  credit  during  the  first  years  of
transition  as  compared  to  foreign  bank  credit  (“denominator  effect”).
27  In  contrast,  Peek  and
Rosengren find broad loan measures that are almost continually increasing.
28 A plausible explanation
for the relatively high level of foreign bank penetration at the very beginning of the transition period, lies
in the fact that already during the 1980s commercial banks were a significant source of external funds
for CEE-countries as close working relationships were built with foreign trade banks. Export credit and
short term finance were for instance important instruments in Poland and Hungary. These countries
were also among the early reformers and were relatively open to foreign participation, as opposed to
for  instance  the  former  Czechoslovakia,  where  bank  privatisation  proceeded  more  slowly  (EBRD,
1998, pp. 77, 85, 97). Hungary, which had the most open attitude towards foreign bank activities, had
already attracted a considerable amount of joint-venture banks with foreign participation, even before
1993. In Poland, foreign banks were involved in the development of the Polish banking system early on
in twinning arrangements with local banks. It is plausible that the early participation of foreign banks in
- and co-operation with - Hungarian and Polish banks led to the relatively large amount of cross-border
                                                
25 See also Kraft (2002) for similar findings for Croatia.
26 For all countries we studied, the narrow loan measure and the broad deposit measure of foreign bank
penetration behave similarly. This is in line with the results of Peek and Rosengren (2000) who argue that this
reflects the close link between the credit granting of local subsidiaries and the availability of funding to these
banks.
27 As opposed to these countries, in the Czech Republic all four penetration measures start from the same low
level and grow with the same pace, reflecting the limited importance of both cross-border credit and credit by
foreign subsidiaries during the beginning of the transition.
28 Between end 1994 and end 1996 domestic bank credit in Hungary and Poland increased by 71% and 79%,
respectively, while domestic credit in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico increased considerably less: by respectively,
18%, 40%, and 32% during the same period (source: own calculations and Peek and Rosengren, 2000). The
denominator effect has thus been less pronounced for the Latin American countries, which is being reflected in
the absence of a U-curve development of the broad loan penetration measure for these countries.26
credit we still observe in our broad loan measure for the year 1993, the first year in our sample period.
29
Indeed, table 1 shows that in 1992 more than 50% and 60% of all BIS credit to Hungary and Poland,
respectively, was absorbed by local banks.
Table 8 Importance of different sources of bank credit in 1999 (% of GDP):




Hungary Poland Slovenia Czech Republic Argentina Brazil Mexico
Cross-border 12.7 7.8 5.0 10.8 14.1 8.5 12.9
Domestic 17.6 32.1 53.6 53.1 23.5 36.9 18.5
Foreign bank
subs.
32.7 10.3 9.8 20.0 17.7 12.4 4.3
Total 63 50 68 84 55 58 36
Foreign
credit  / total
credit
72% 36% 22% 37% 58% 36% 48%
Sources: BankScope, EBRD, Peek and Rosengren (2000), BIS consolidated international banking statistics and
www.worldbank.org/data/.
Finally, we can compare the relative importance of the different sources of bank credit for both the
CEE and the Latin American economies. Table 8 shows the quantitative importance of different bank
credit sources end 1999, the last period for which Peek and Rosengren (2000) have calculated their
penetration measures for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
30 First of all, it becomes clear that in both
regions cross-border credit amounted to between 5% and 15% of GDP. Secondly, both domestic bank
credit and credit by foreign bank subsidiaries were somewhat more important in CEE - compared to
GDP  -  than  in  Latin  America.    As  a  result,  total  depth  of  the  banking  sector  was  higher  in  CEE
(unweighted average: 66% of GDP) compared to Latin America (unweighted average: 50% of GDP).
Finally, the last row of table 8 shows foreign bank credit (both cross-border and locally granted) as a
percentage of total bank credit (i.e. the broad loan measure). As it turns out, in 1999 foreign bank
penetration was still somewhat lower in CEE than in Latin America, mainly due to the relatively closed
economy  of  Slovenia.  However,  with  additional  bank  privatisations  in  2000  and  2001  foreign  bank
penetration in this region has increased further significantly.
                                                
29 An overview of foreign bank subsidiaries, branches, representative offices, and joint ventures in Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic during the first years of the transition can be found in Bonin et al (1998).
30 Table 8 does not show data for the outlier Estonia, where for instance credit by foreign bank subsidiaries
increased from 0% in 1999 to 53% of GDP in 2000. However, the corresponding data for Estonia can easily be
found in tables 5-7.27
5.  Concluding remarks
We  can  now  examine  whether  our  a  priori  expectations,  as  described  in  sub-section  2.3,  are
corroborated by our statistical findings. First, we find that in all five countries total foreign bank credit
has  increased  substantially  during  our  sample  period  when  compared  to  GDP.  When  compared  to
domestic credit, the importance of foreign bank credit has gradually increased as well. However, in
Hungary and Poland, foreign banks were also important during the first years of the transition period,
as they provided a substantial share of all credit in the country through cross-border operations. In
these  countries,  cross-border  credit  declined  relative  to  domestic  credit  during  the  first  years  of
transition,  whereas  foreign  subsidiaries  only  became  important  some  years  later.  For  Hungary  and
Poland, and also for Estonia, we find that the narrow penetration measures increased quicker than the
broad ones, indicating that credit by foreign subsidiaries grew faster than cross-border foreign credit. In
contrast, in Slovenia and the Czech Republic the growth of both foreign credit sources was more equal.
Finally,  we  find  no  evidence  of  a  persistent  lowering  in  foreign  bank  credit  during  unfavourable
economic times. Temporary reductions in cross-border credit into Estonia, Hungary and the Czech
Republic were met by increases in local subsidiaries’ credit, which noticed an opportunity to expand.
These conclusions could only be drawn because we combine two separate data sources, the BIS data
and the BankScope data. Our findings confirm earlier results on foreign banking in Latin America,
which showed that foreign subsidiaries expanded their business during economic downturns, either by
acquisition  or  internal  growth,  whereas  cross-border  lending  did  sometimes  retrench  during  crisis
periods. This may be an important consideration for policy makers in those transition countries that
have not (yet) fully opened up their banking markets. Of course, it is still too early for drawing any
definite  conclusions.  After  all,  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  credit  supply  of  mostly  Western
European subsidiaries in the CEE region will survive a significant and lengthy slowdown in these banks’
home country economies.
The large number of banks in our sample, of which detailed data are available for eight years,
would  make  panel  estimates  a  likely  route  for  future  work.  Further  research  could  also  focus  on
discerning the main determinants of foreign bank penetration. It would be particularly interesting to see
whether, and if so, which institutional and macroeconomic characteristics of the host countries have
influenced the level of foreign bank penetration.28
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Appendix: dataset construction
Our BIS data include the local claims in non-local currencies of the foreign affiliates - both subsidiaries
and branches - of these banks in CEE.
31 To obtain the total foreign claims, i.e. not only foreign currency
claims but local currency claims as well, we combine the cross-border claims (in  all currencies) and
the  foreign  currency  claims  of  reporting  affiliates  in  CEE  with  the  local  currency  claims  of  these
affiliates. Furthermore,  we want to avoid double-counting if a foreign bank has a claim on another
foreign bank that then lends to local firms. To prevent such double-counting, we subtract the claims on
banks with head-offices outside the particular CEE-country from the total consolidated claims.
32
As  regards  our  BankScope  data,  we  labelled  each  bank  with  the  dummy  “domestic”  or
“foreign” for every year in the 1993-2000 period. This “manual” ownership classification of each bank
/  year  combination  was  necessary  because  the  BankScope  database  only  gives  information  on
ownership structure for the point in time this database is last updated (in our case November 2001).
Since  changes  in  ownership  structure  in  the  CEE  banking  sector  have  been  frequent  during  the
transition process and since we are particularly interested in the relative importance of domestic versus
foreign banks, we thought it essential to carefully unravel all the ownership changes in our sample
period. Furthermore, if a specific domestic - say Polish - bank was taken over in the course of 1995, it
was considered to be “domestic” for the 1993-1995 period (including 1995) and “foreign” for the 1996-
2000 period.
33 The consulted sources for the ownership dummy and changes therein were Reuters,
individual bank web sites, economic and business publications on the subject, and correspondence with
CEE central bank and supervisory officials. We switched the ownership dummy from “foreign” to
                                                
31 Positions between offices of the same bank are netted out. Our data exclude 4 of the 24 reporting countries
(Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Turkey) since banks headquartered in these countries have started to
report to the BIS only very recently. The BIS-claims include most kinds of financial assets, such as deposits and
balances  with  other  banks,  loans  and  advances  to  banks  and  non-banks,  holdings  of  securities,  and  loan
participations and syndications. For the period 1993-1999 we interpolated the semi-annual data to obtain quarterly
series. After 1999 the BIS provides quarterly data.
32 Cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in foreign currencies are reported by the BIS as one
inseparable series only. Local claims in local currency are reported as a separate series. More specifically, we used
the BIS Data Bank Block M (“International Banking Statistics and External Debt”) and subtracted data type J
(“cross-border claims - with head offices outside the country”) from the sum of data types A (“cross-border
claims  in  all  currencies  and  local  claims  in  non-local  currencies”)  and  L  (“local  currency  claims  on  local
residents”). In figure 1, columns A, L and J are depicted in the third pane (by country) by means of the solid,
striped and dotted lines respectively.
33  Additionally,  we  further  divided  all  foreign  bank  subsidiaries  into  those  with  their  headquarter  in  a  BIS
reporting country and those headquartered in a non-BIS reporting country. The number of non BIS foreign bank
subsidiaries proved to be very limited. In 2000, only one Czech subsidiary operated in Poland and a Russian and a
Korean one in Hungary. In addition, these banks were very small. In terms of total assets, the Czech subsidiary
took up the 26th position in Poland (out of 30 banks in our sample) and the Russian and Korean banks the 8th
and 20th position, respectively, in Hungary (out of 23).31
“domestic” 34 times.
34 Finally, we aggregated the BankScope data on individual banks for each country
and each year. These aggregated figures for both domestic bank credit and credit by foreign bank
subsidiaries  were  calculated  by  subtracting  non-earning  assets,  equity  investments  and  fixed  assets
from the sum of total assets and loan loss reserves. Figure 4 summarises the data we use and its
sources (all data refer to stock variables). Firstly, as the figure illustrates, we have data on total claims
by BIS reporting banks on the individual CEE-countries. These comprise both lending by CEE-located
foreign bank affiliates with a BIS reporting headquarter as well as the cross-border lending by these
headquarters themselves. Secondly, we have BankScope data on foreign bank subsidiaries located in
CEE, irrespective of whether their headquarter reports to the BIS or not. Thirdly, we have data on
lending by domestic CEE banks. As a result, the only bank credit source of CEE enterprises we miss,
is cross-border claims by non-BIS reporting foreign banks.
 However, note that BIS cross-border credit
(topmost arrow in figure 4) and foreign currency denominated credit by BIS reporting bank affiliates
(“$-arrow” in figure 4) are reported by the BIS as one series only (see footnote  32).  To  get  the
separate amount of “true” cross-border credit, we first add the local currency denominated credit by
BIS reporting foreign affiliates (“local currency”-arrow in figure 4) to this combined series. We now
have a measure of all credit extended by BIS reporting banks to a particular CEE-country, whether
cross-border or through a local affiliate and irrespective of the currency of denomination as well. After
that, we subtract the total amount of credit extended by the foreign BIS reporting subsidiaries, as taken
from BankScope (topmost dashed arrow in figure 4) in order to compute the amount of cross border
credit.
We think that the combination of BIS-data and BankScope-data cover the majority of banking
activities  in  the  countries  we  examine.  First  of  all,  as  the  importance  of  non-BIS  foreign  bank
subsidiaries in CEE (including those from other CEE countries), proves to be very limited (cf. footnote
33),  we  expect  that  cross-border  credit  flows  from  non-BIS  reporting  foreign  banks  are  not  very
substantial either. The BIS-data then provide a good approximation of all consolidated credit by foreign
banks to the CEE countries we study, whether by foreign parent banks located abroad, through local
branches or through local subsidiaries.
In order to compute the true amount of cross-border credit we subtract credit by BIS-reporting
foreign bank subsidiaries, as taken from BankScope, from the BIS-numbers. In as far as not all BIS-
reporting  subsidiaries  would  be  included  in  our  BankScope  sample,  this  would  lead  to  an
underestimation  of  the  amount  of  credit  by  foreign  bank  subsidiaries  and  an  equally  large
                                                
34 In these cases, the ownership information from BankScope for the year 2001 showed that the bank in question
was foreign owned. When our additional information indicated that this bank was taken-over in for instance 1996,
we changed the dummy from “foreign” to “domestic” for the year 1996 and before. We made the following
number of dummy changes in each year: 8 in 2000, 9 in 1999, 2 in 1998, 8 in 1997, 2 in 1996, 2 in 1995 and 3 in 1993.32
overestimation of total cross-border credit. In order to investigate whether this was a serious problem,
we performed an extensive check on the coverage of the BankScope data by comparing them with
information taken from internet and gained through e-mail contact with central banks in the region. This
revealed that the BankScope database contains in general a good coverage of the domestic banks and
foreign  bank  subsidiaries  in  the  countries  we  study.  Any  differences  could  often  be  explained  by
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